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Abstract
The April 16, 2007 mass casualty incident at Virginia Tech had an immediate, significant, and enduring impact on approaches to campus safety in
the United States. In the aftermath of the incident, there were numerous
campus safety reviews, not only at Virginia Tech, but across the Commonwealth of Virginia, across the nation, and around the world. Those reviews
by campus administrations, state and federal government agencies, professional associations, victim advocacy groups, and law enforcement bodies,
resulted in hundreds of campus safety recommendations. Many of those
recommendations were intended to improve reactive aspects of physical security, emergency preparedness, law enforcement response, and emergency
notification. However, several recommendations addressed preventative approaches to enhance campus safety and bolster institutions’ capabilities to
identify, investigate, assess and manage actual and potential threats of violence to the campus community. This article will summarize the changes
in approaches to behavioral threat assessment and management among institutions of higher education in the United States, drawing on the lessons
confirmed and learned from the Virginia Tech incident and those that followed through various research efforts.
Keywords: threat assessment, higher education, United States, Virginia
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On April 16, 2007, a student at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State
University (Virginia Tech) committed a horrific, mass-casualty attack
that resulted in the deaths of 32 people, and the wounding or injuring
of another 27 persons. The seriousness of the incident drew significant attention to campus safety and a review of the capabilities of institutions of higher education to prepare for (and respond to) such incidents, to provide timely warnings to community members regarding
significant ongoing dangers, and to physically secure campus buildings. As further information became available regarding both the perpetrator’s background and behavior prior to the attack, and the institutions’ response to his behavior; colleges and universities engaged
in significant systematizing of their campus systems to enable them
to better identify and intervene with persons’ who were engaging in
concerning and threatening behavior (Midwestern Higher Education
Compact, 2008).

Summary of the Incident at Virginia Tech
Shortly after 7:10 a.m. on April 16, 2007, a then-unknown perpetrator shot two victims (both students) in West Ambler Johnson Residence Hall on the Virginia Tech campus. Both victims died as a result
of their injuries. Approximately 2 hr and 40 min later, the (still unknown) perpetrator chained the interior handles of the entry doors to
Norris Hall, a classroom and laboratory building near the center of the
campus. He then went to the second floor of the building where several classes were in session. He looked into several of the classrooms
before initiating his attack and then entered one of the classrooms,
shooting and killing the professor and then killing or wounding most
of the students in the classroom. He then proceeded to other classrooms along the hallway, killing and wounding where ever he gained
access, often returning to the same room multiple times. Nearly all
the victims suffered multiple gunshot wounds, some as many as 17. In
approximately 11 min, the perpetrator had fired over 170 rounds from
two semiautomatic pistols. As responding law enforcement officers
gained entry to the building and advanced to the second floor to confront him, the perpetrator took his own life. Investigation would show
that he had fired 174 rounds and that he still had over 200 rounds of
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unexpended ammunition at the time that he killed himself (Virginia
Governor’s Panel Report, 2007).
In all, 32 persons were killed during the incident— two in West Ambler Johnson, and 30 in Norris Hall. During the Norris Hall portion of
the attack, the perpetrator also shot another 17 persons, all of whom
survived their injuries. At least 10 students were seriously injured as
they escaped one of the classrooms through the second story windows.
Within Norris Hall during the attack were another 100 or more faculty, staff, or students who were not physically injured but were exposed to the horrific consequences of the attack (Virginia Governor’s
Panel Report, 2007).

Lessons Confirmed and Learned: Policy and Practice
Reviews of the Virginia Tech Incident
The community, and the nation, were horrified by the attack. In the
aftermath, there was tremendous support for the Virginia Tech community. There were also strong questions about how such a tragedy
could have occurred and what, if anything, could be done to prevent
such an incident or to mitigate harm. Charles Steger, President of
Virginia Tech, commissioned several internal committees to review
various aspects campus safety and security. These include aspects
of physical security, emergency preparedness, emergency communications, student conduct policies, student mental health services,
law enforcement and emergency medical services response to the
incident, and how the university had dealt with the perpetrator in
the years prior to the incident (Blythe, 2007; Hyatt, 2007; Niles,
2007). Those committees identified several areas for modification
of institutional policy and practices related to campus safety and security systems, policies, and practices. The internal reviews found
that there were significant points of contact with the perpetrator
(prior to the incident) in which other faculty, staff, or students had
concerns about his behavior or about his welfare. The reviews also
found that many people misunderstood laws and policies regarding
sharing of information and that this had contributed to people not
reporting concerns. This, along with the fragmented and compartmentalized information regarding the subject, lead to no entity on
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campus having a full understanding of the nature of his concerns or
the impact of his behavior. The committees outlined several recommendations to address these concerns, including:
• Creating a threat assessment team charged with examining the
most complex cases of distressed students and empowering it to
act quickly, when necessary.
• Expanding case management capacity by adding case managers to
the Dean of Students office and Cook Counseling Center to improve follow-up with students and to improve information flow
through appropriate units about students at risk.
• Improve communications in the systems with particular emphasis
on privacy law education throughout the university, clarifying
policies for communications with external agencies, establishing a central university contact with a clear picture of distressed
students (Hincker, 2007).
In addition, and at the request of President Steger, the Governor of
Virginia appointed a panel of experts to conduct an external review of
the incident, the perpetrator, and university and community services
with whom the perpetrator had interacted. The Virginia Tech Review
Panel offered over 70 recommendations directed to both Virginia Tech
and to Virginia campuses broadly. Among the recommendations were
several related to identification and intervention of subjects who may
pose a threat to the campus. Specifically, the Panel recommended that
“Virginia Tech and other institutions of higher learning should have
a threat assessment team that includes representatives from law enforcement, human resources, student and academic affairs, legal counsel, and mental health functions” (Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007,
p. 19). The panel further recommended that “Incidents of aberrant,
dangerous, or threatening behavior must be documented and reported
immediately to a college’s threat assessment group, and must be acted
upon in a prompt and effective manner to protect the safety of the
campus community” (Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007, p. 53). These
recommendations were fully consistent with the finding from the Virginia Tech internal reviews and would subsequently guide legislation
in Virginia (discussed further below).
In addition to the reviews noted above, the Office of the Inspector
General (OIG) for the Virginia Department of Mental Health, Mental
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Retardation & Substance Abuse Services (Stewart, 2007) conducted a
postincident review of the services provided through state facilities or
health care providers. The report summarized various points of contact with the subject who ultimately committed the mass shooting at
Virginia Tech. That summary was represented in a diagram (recreated
in Figure 1 below) that outline the fragmented and scattered points of
concern that had existing regarding the subject during the Fall semester of 2005, nearly 18 months prior to the attack. That diagram helped
emphasize the difficulty in identifying and intervening effectively with
developing concerns when information was compartmentalized. The
lack of a centralized resource to gather such concerns, and then analyze and act upon them as appropriate, significantly inhibited the organization’s ability to detect and respond to developing concerns.
In addition to the internal communication challenges that limited
opportunities for intervention with the subject, the OIG review (Stewart, 2007) also pointed out the shortcomings of approaches to clinical
assessment of dangerousness based primarily or solely on information provided by the subject of the evaluation. The review scrutinized
the process by which the subject had been evaluated during an involuntary hospitalization that had occurred in December 2005, following suicidal comments made to others. The review found that some
evaluators had relied primarily on intake documentation and brief

Figure 1. Diagram of communications regarding the individual within the Virginia Tech Community, Fall, 2005. Prepared based upon graphic in OIG Report
#140–07: Investigation of the April 16, 2007 Critical Incident at Virginia Tech.
Office of the Inspector General for Mental Health, Mental Retardation and Substance Abuse Services, Commonwealth of Virginia.
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interviews with the subject to assess the danger he posed to self or
others. The review stated:
psychiatric evaluation and assessment using sufficient collateral
information to ensure an accurate understanding of the individual, the individual’s environment, his recent behaviors, and the
context of the psychological crisis that precipitated the psychiatric emergency which warranted a temporary detention order.
(Stewart, 2007, p. 33)

Dr. Aradhana Bela Sood, a psychiatrist who was also one of the
members of the Virginia Tech Review Panel addressed similar concerns in her book (Sood & Cohen, 2015). No such comprehensive and
collaborative evaluation was done with the subject from Virginia Tech
nor is such an approach to evaluation typical across acute psychiatric
settings (Giggie, 2015). While proactive threat assessment and management of persons exhibiting concerning behavior on campus remains important, where mental health concerns are concurrent and
contributory to violence risk, and lead to acute evaluation, there needs
to be a similar integrated collaborative approach in assessing and
managing violence risk among patients. The Governor’s Panel recommended that “The role and responsibilities of the independent evaluator in the commitment process should be clarified and steps taken to
assure that the necessary reports and collateral information are assembled before the independent evaluator conducts the evaluation”
(Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007, p. 61). In Virginia and across the
nation, work remains to be done to meet this standard.
State or System Campus Safety Reviews
The Virginia Tech internal reviews and the Governors Review Panel
would serve as foundation and stimulus for other states (e.g., Arkansas, California, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nevada, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Wisconsin) to conduct similar reviews of campus safety issues (see the Appendix for a listing of some
of those reviews). Indeed, approximately 1 year after the tragedy, a
national survey of over 330 institutions of higher education found
that 87% had already completed a comprehensive review of campus
safety and security concerns that had resulted in changes to safety policies, procedures, or systems (Midwestern Higher Education Compact,
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2008). Nearly all of the reviews recommended that institutions of
higher education implement campus threat assessment teams (International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators
[IACLEA], 2008; O’Neill et al., 2008).
Legislative Approaches
The Commonwealth of Virginia became the first state to legislate a
statutory requirement for public (state owned and supported by government taxes) institutions of higher education in the Commonwealth
to “implement policies and procedures for the prevention of violence
on campus, including assessment and intervention with individuals
whose behavior poses a threat to the safety of the campus community” (Virginia, 2008). Campuses are required to:
1. Provide guidance to faculty, staff, and students regarding
threatening or unusual behavior.
2. Identify means and members of the institution where community members should report concerning behavior.
3. Establish policies and procedures for reporting of concerns.
4. Establish policies and procedures for assessing and intervening
with individuals engaging in threatening behavior.
The statute further requires public campuses to develop, implement, and operate threat assessment teams. The threat assessment
teams must include (at minimum) members from law enforcement;
professionals from mental health, student affairs, and human resources; and (as available) legal counsel. Note that many campuses
in Virginia (and across the United States) have their own campus police or law enforcement agency. Where this is not the case, campuses
would develop agreements with local law enforcement agencies to fulfill the proscribed role. The teams are charged with the authority and
responsibility to implement the violence prevention and intervention
policies established by the campuses.
In 2008, following a mass casualty incident at Northern Illinois
University, the Illinois Legislature enacted a statute requiring public
and private (not state owned) institutions within Illinois to develop
and implement a campus threat assessment team (Illinois Campus Security Enhancement 110 ILCS 12/20, 2008).
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Similarly, in 2013, following the mass casualty incident at Sandy
Hook Elementary School, the Connecticut legislature (Connecticut,
2013) enacted legislation requiring both state and independent institutions of higher education to establish threat assessment teams.
Following the mass casualty incident at Sandy Hook Elementary
School, the Governor of Virginia appointed a School and Campus
Safety Task Force to review safety concerns impacting elementary
and secondary schools, as well as institutions of higher education. The
Task Force made several recommendations, including that the Assembly of Virginia extend the existing threat assessment statutes to be inclusive of public school divisions in Virginia. In July of 2013, Virginia
became the first state in the nation to require behavioral threat assessment and management teams in all of public education, from kindergarten to postgraduate education (Virginia, 2013).
Standards of Practice
Well before the Virginia Tech incident there were established approaches, models, and guidance for dealing with persons exhibiting
concerning behavior or who posed a threat to the educational community. Delworth (1989) outlined a framework for improving institutional responses to students with complex behavioral and emotional
concerns. The assessment–intervention of student problems (AISP)
model was ahead of its time in recognizing the need for collaborative
and systematic approaches. Delworth noted that
[a]ll campuses have or should have some system in place for handling the discipline or judicial problems and the psychological
problems of students. The issue often becomes one of insufficient
coordination, inadequate informational flow, and a lack of shared
process. (Delworth, 1989, p. 9)

While not specifically about students who posed a threat of violence, her comments on the challenges faced in addressing such concerns, were remarkably prescient. Deisinger and colleagues drew
from Delworth’s model in their development and implementation of
a threat assessment team at Iowa State University during the 1993–
94 academic year (Jaeger, Deisinger, Houghton, & Cychosz, 1993).
Dunkle, Silverstein, and Warner (2008) outlined and further adapted
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Delworth’s model specifically for use both as a campus threat assessment team, as well as for an approach to maximizing effectiveness in
responding to students with complex mental health concerns.
Following a violent incident at Concordia College in Montreal Canada in 1992, the institution’s Board of Governors commissioned a review lead by Dr. John Cowan. The 1994 Cowan report provided an indepth review of the case facts and timeline. The report also identified
several issues including the need for a central clearinghouse of information to improve institutional memory and awareness of long-term
behavioral concerns, the need to formalize existing crisis management
processes to enhance their effectiveness, reduce compartmentalization of awareness of concerns and related decision making, the need
for coordination and collective decision making regarding critical issues (Cowan, 1994). Cowan’s findings would be replicated in many of
the campus safety reviews that followed the Virginia Tech incident.
Following the mass casualty incident at Columbine High School in
April 1999, several agencies and organizations reviewed issues related
to school and workplace safety, many of which parallel the issues and
challenges faced by institutions of higher education. Mohandie (2000)
published a comprehensive guide to conducting threat assessment in
elementary and secondary school. Also, Meloy (2000) summarized the
existing literature on targeted violence as well as approaches to the
assessment and management of cases across sectors. Vossekuil, Fein,
Reddy, Borum, and Modzeleski (2002) conducted a review of school
shootings that had occurred over several years and identified several
behaviors relevant to identifying risk for escalation of violence and
for guiding interventions.
Similarly, following a violent incident at a University of North Carolina system campus in 2004, in which two students were killed, the
UNC system conducted a comprehensive review of campus safety issues. In the 2004 final report, the task force recommended that system campuses should train faculty and staff to identify and intervene
with applicants who may pose a danger to the university community.
Further the campuses should maintain campus safety committees, and
conduct campus threat assessments to identify sources of threats to
the campuses (University of North Carolina Office of the President,
2004). The precipitating case involved an individual that had raised
concerns during the admissions processes and the recommendations
were narrowly oriented around persons in the admissions process.
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This contributed to many of the UNC campuses not implementing
threat assessment processes until after the incident at Virginia Tech.
In 2003, The U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services convened a National Summit on Campus Public Safety (U.S. Department of Justice, 2004). The summit report commented on the weak coordination between senior university executives
and leaders of campus safety and security functions. The report also
commented on the inconsistency in prevention and security practices
across campuses, noting that “There are few collective efforts and, as
such, threat assessment, prevention, and response strategies may differ significantly” (U.S. Department of Justice, 2004, p. 38). The report
noted the lack of any national campus safety resource center to support information sharing across campuses as contributing to the lack
of information sharing and awareness of developing practices. The
summit made several recommendations including campuses adopting an all-hazards (i.e., regardless of origin or type) approach to preventing and dealing with incidents. The report stated that
… An all-hazards approach to crisis prevention, response, and
management enhances the overall coordination of activities among
responding organizations, improves early warning and notification, allows for improved and continued assessment of potential
consequences, and fosters continuity of operations during and after a crisis. (U.S. Department of Justice, 2004, p. 64)

Since the time of the report, many of the recommendations have
been implemented, including the formation and operation of a National Center for Campus Public Safety.
In 2006, the Association of Threat Assessment Professionals (ATAP,
2006) published professional guidelines for the practice of threat assessment. While not specific to colleges and universities, the guidelines represented a basic standard of practice for threat assessment
and management across sectors.
Following the Virginia Tech incident, several professional associations, governmental agencies, and independent bodies reviewed campus safety concerns and provided recommendations related to campus safety in general. Many of those also provided recommendations
or guidance related to threat assessment on campus.
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Professional Associations
The International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators (IACLEA), a professional association for campus law enforcement and security directors, conducted a review of campus safety
concerns. The review included a summary of several violent attacks
impacting campuses and a summary of the state and system reviews
then available. The association (IACLEA, 2008) concurred with the
collective recommendations that
[i]nstitutions of higher education should have a behavioral threat
assessment team that includes representatives from law enforcement, human resources, student and academic affairs, legal counsel, and mental health functions. Specifically, campus public safety
should be included on the team. (IACLEA, 2008, p. 7)

McBain (2008), writing in the newsletter for the American Association of State Colleges and Universities (AASCU), noted the challenges
inherent in attempting to balance student privacy, campus safety and
public well-being. The AASCU document also provided several basic
guidelines for institutions including educating faculty and staff about
lawful information sharing, encouraging students with mental health
issues to seek assistance, minimizing mental health service gaps in
the community and on campus, and the development of centralized
threat assessment teams.
A survey of 342 campuses conducted in August 2008 found that approximately two thirds of campuses surveyed had some sort of multidisciplinary team to address emotional crises or concerns of faculty,
staff, or students, with 93% of the teams focused on students. (Campus Safety & Security Project, 2009). Another 13% of survey respondents were in the process of developing such teams. However, less
than half of campuses surveyed had an established threat assessment
team to assess and manage threatening or violent behaviors. Only
37% of public 2-year campuses had such a team, while approximately
60% of 4-year campuses had such a team. Another 19% of survey respondents reported that their campus was in the process of developing such a team.
In 2010, the ASME Innovative Technologies Institute published an
independent review and standard regarding campus risk analysis. This
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American National Standards Institute (ANSI) standard addressed
both natural and human made risks impacting on higher education.
The standard recommended that “Threat Assessment Teams be put
into place on campus to help identify potential persons of concern and
gather and analyze information regarding the potential threat posed
by an individual(s)” (ASME, 2010, pp. 9 –10). The standard recognized
model threat assessment management approaches that met guidelines,
including those outlined in Deisinger, Randazzo, O’Neill, and Savage
(2008) and Randazzo and Plummer (2009). (see Nolan, Randazzo, &
Deisinger, 2011 and Deisinger, Randazzo, Marisa, & Nolan, 2014 for
further discussion of the relevance of ANSI standards informing the
standard of practice for threat assessment and management.)
Government Agencies
Following the Virginia Tech incident, the U.S. Secretaries of Education
and Health & Human Services, along with the U.S. Attorney General
provided a report to the President of the United States, outlining several recommendations regarding campus safety (Leavitt, Spellings, &
Gonzalez, 2007). These included the need for:
• Greater awareness for professionals from various disciplines regarding the lawful sharing critical information on persons who
pose a danger;
• More effective implementation of violence prevention programs
and responses to reported threats of violence;
• Improved awareness for faculty, staff, students, and parents regarding warnings signs of violence and mental illness, as well
as means of reporting concerns;
• Adequate care for persons with mental illness;
• Improved research of targeted violence in institutions of higher
education.
The last recommendation resulted in a joint project of the United
States Secret Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the U.S.
Department of Education, focused on targeted violence related to campuses (Drysdale, Modzeleski, & Simons, 2010). The report provided
an analysis of 272 incidents of targeted violence related to U.S. institutions of higher education between the early 1900s and 2008. The
report spoke to the role of threat assessment teams in identifying,
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assessing, and managing threats posed to the campus community. The
report cautioned that “[b]lanket characterizations, demographic profiles, or stereotypes do not provide a reliable basis for making judgments of the threat posed by a particular individual” (Drysdale et al,
2010, p. 27).
In response to misunderstanding and misperceptions regarding
laws related to student privacy, the U.S. Department of Education
(2007) quickly provided clarity that relevant Federal law, the Family Educational Rights Privacy Act (FERPA) provided ample latitude
to lawfully share otherwise protected information with other educational officials with a need to know. Further, guidance clarified that
the law allowed for sharing of relevant information, even outside the
institution, where public safety concerns existed. In 2008, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and U.S. Department of Education (2008) jointly published guidance clarifying issues related to
the release of educational and treatment records regarding students.
The guidance document addressed authorized releases of information
and records in general, and specifically in situations in which a student was reasonably believed to be a serious danger to self or others.
While the incident at Virginia Tech had highlighted how misunderstanding of privacy laws could limit lawful information sharing, it was
also important to maintain a focus on assisting students where possible and balancing the needs, well-being and privacy of the student
as well as the safety of the student and others who may be impacted
or harmed by the actions of the student. Several leading organizations (Higher Education Mental Health Alliance, 2013; JED Foundation,
2008; National Association of College & University Attorney’s, 2007;
2014) promulgated guidance to assist campuses with those issues.
From 2009 to 2011, the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services provided 10 training sessions around
the nation. These sessions were provided at no cost to participants
and focused on helping colleges and universities to develop and implement behavioral threat assessment and management program, using
established practices, supported by research (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2009; see also
http://campusthreatassessment.org ).
In 2013, several agencies of the U.S. Government collaborated to
provide guidelines regarding prevention, mitigation, response, and recovery to mass casualty incidents occurring at institutions of higher
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education (U.S. Department of Education, 2013). The guidelines recommended that campuses implement and operate threat assessment
teams to help identify and intervene with potential threats.
Paparazzo, Eith, and Tocco (2013) and then the Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers and Johns Hopkins University (2014) published findings from national summits on the prevention of mass casualty incidents. Both examined the issues and challenges faced by
organizations across sectors, including higher education. Both recommended that government entities and organizations “Identify and
promote the use of interdisciplinary models designed to prevent multiple casualty incidents through threat assessment and intervention”
(Paparazzo et al., 2013, p. 13). The summits also recommended implementation of community-based approaches (in addition to campus based) to support effective prevention and intervention efforts.
Both summits reflected the need for more and better research to inform practice.

Lessons Confirmed and Learned: Research
As well-publicized attacks at universities resulted in heightened public concern regarding targeted violence on college campuses, threat
assessment was frequently recommended as a strategy of choice for
the prevention of targeted violence within postsecondary education
(Deisinger, Randazzo, O’Neill, & Savage, 2008; Pollard, Nolan, & Deisinger, 2012; Scalora, Simons, & VanSlyke, 2010). Randazzo and Cameron (2012) detailed the evolution of behavioral threat assessment
processes from the original Secret Service model used to evaluate
threats against public figures, to its adaptations for workplace settings and United States K–12 schools, to its current configuration in
colleges and universities. Not surprisingly, threat assessment research
has followed a similar evolutionary process.
While much attention has focused upon disgruntled students as
perpetrators of targeted violence within campuses, several aspects
of campus are vulnerable to targeted violence, as grievances regarding workplace dismissals, romantic difficulties, and academic conflicts have motivated past campus violence (Drysdale et al., 2010;
Scalora et al., 2010). Cao et al. (2013) described the range of one campus threat assessment team’s activity. Employees were the subject in
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21.5% of events, students in 60.2%, and visitors in 18.3%. External
threats, including assaults, threats, harassment, and stalking comprised 49.5% of cases.
Subsequent to several high-profile incidents of campus targeted violence (including that at Virginia Tech), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), United States Secret Service (USSS), and Department
of Education conducted a thorough review of open-source material
regarding campus attacks between 1900 and 2008 (Drysdale et al.,
2010). As expected, these events were rare (i.e., 272 discoverable incidents) and involved different locations and perpetrator characteristics.
Attacks were perpetrated by students, employees, alumni, and indirect affiliates of the school (e.g., a significant other of a staff member);
however, around 10% of attacks involved individuals with no known
connection to the school. Different motivations for the attack were observed, including intimate relationship difficulties (34%), retaliation
for wrongdoing (14%), response to academic struggles (10%), and
workplace dismissal or sanction (6%). The majority of incidents included indications of planning, as 73% involved the perpetrator targeting specific individuals. Threatening statements, stalking, harassing behavior, and/or physical aggression preceded targeted violence
in 31% of cases. These preincident actions were observed by family,
friends, employees, or the target.
The presence of preincident behavior noted in the campus attacks
study is consistent with other literature noting leakage of intention
and preincident indicators of violence in other targeted violence
contexts (Meloy & O’Toole, 2011). Until recently, limited examination of preincident behavior was researched within collegiate settings (Hollister & Scalora, 2015; Hollister, Scalora, Hoff, & Marquez,
2014; Sulkowski, 2011; Sulkowski & Lazarus, 2011). As a result, significant effort to bystander issues within campuses received significant attention.
Initial research analyzing preincident reporting by collegiate stakeholders included responses to hypothetical scenarios of threatening
behavior. A survey of 967 college students responding to vignettes of
grievances and multiple threats from hypothetical individuals indicated 70% of students were willing to inform authorities (Sulkowski,
2011). Students possessing trust in campus services and connection to
campus were more likely to report. Another study included college students, faculty, and staff (Hollister et al., 2012) responding to vignettes
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of concerning behavior. Large variability was seen in willingness to inform authorities across situations (i.e., 9%–91% for students; 39%–
100% for faculty/staff), and students, faculty, and staff were more
willing to inform authorities after viewing multiple behaviors, direct threats, and/or weapons. Moreover, faculty/ staff seemed to have
higher reporting rates than students regardless of the scenario.
Recently, information about the prevalence and distribution of campus preincident behavior observations has been examined (Hollister
et al., 2014). In a sample of college students, 35% reported viewing
preincident activity on campus. These individuals did not differ from
those that had not seen threatening behavior in most measured variables (e.g., age, gender, ethnicity, self-reported delinquency), except
higher campus connectedness related to an increased likelihood of observing concerning behavior. Those willing to report had greater trust
in campus police, less feelings of safety on campus, and less self-reported delinquency. Campus connectedness and peer loyalty did not
appear to influence willingness to report. Therefore, the observation
of preincident behavior appeared somewhat frequently in this sample, and no demographic differences were significantly related to increased likelihood of preincident observance.
Research efforts assessed reporting activity in response to specific
preincident behaviors. A general campus sample was asked if they
had observed an individual displaying any of a range of preincident
behaviors, and 38% indicated seeing at least one preincident behavior on campus (Hollister et al., 2014). Inquiries about responses revealed these situations are infrequently reported to police (i.e., about
25% of observers informed authorities). However, concerning specific
preincident behaviors: instances of acquisition or interest in weapons (43%), suicidal statements or attempts (40%), repetitive face-toface contact (37%), and/or assault (36%) were the most frequently
reported. Situations with vandalism or property theft (22%), threatening statements (25%), and/or threatening gestures were the most
unlikely to be extended to authorities.
The attention to bystander issues overlaps with other areas of violence prevention addressed within collegiate settings. Growing awareness arose of the scope of violence against women on college campuses (Banyard, 2014). As a result, there was a need for campus threat
assessment activities to potentially assist general campus violence
prevention. For example, campus threat assessment efforts can also

D e i s i n g e r & S c a l o r a i n J. o f T h r e at A s s e s s m e n t & M g m t. 2 0 1 6

17

address sexual assault (Paul & Gray, 2011), stalking (Buhi, Clayton, &
Surrency, 2009), and general criminal activity (Selwyn, 2008) prevention. Spitzberg (2016) noted a range of unwanted pursuit, threats,
assault, and stalking behavior encountered by college students. Across
two college student surveys, approximately 14% to 27% of the overall
student population reported unwanted pursuit or harassment during
their time on campus. Further 5% to 9% of those surveyed experienced threats, and about 1% experienced physical assault in the context of such harassment episodes (Spitzberg, 2016).
As with the threat assessment literature, research related to sexual
and dating violence on college campuses also reveal significant underreporting of such victimization by victims (Sabina & Ho, 2014). In a review of 45 empirical articles and reports, Sabina and Ho (2014) found
that rates of informal disclosure were considerably higher than rates
of formal disclosure. Recent research has evaluated the impact of bystander intervention programs related to sexual assault on campuses
(Cares et al., 2015; McMahon, Banyard, & McMahon, 2015). Coker et
al. (2016) performed a multiyear evaluation of a bystander intervention’s campus-level impact on reducing interpersonal violence victimization and perpetration behavior on college campuses. The authors
found that violence rates were lower on intervention versus comparison campuses for unwanted sexual victimization, sexual harassment, stalking, and psychological dating violence victimization and
perpetration.
The above detailed research implies that many preincident behaviors overlap across multiple areas of violence encountered within
campuses. Hollister and Scalora (2015) suggest the generalizability
of campus threat assessment across collegiate bullying, intimate partner, stalking, and workplace violence concerns given the overlap of
preincident behaviors across various activities. The overlap of preincident behavior for various types of campus violence had been reviewed through self-reports from collegiate stakeholders (Hollister
et al., 2014). Students who observed an individual engaging in preincident behaviors were separated into individuals that encountered
physical assault, sexual assault, or neither activity. Most participants
who witnessed preincident behaviors for physical assault (84%) as
well as those for sexual assault (56%) observed preincident behaviors
in addition to assault such as physical following, repetitive unwanted
face-to-face contact, threatening gestures, and threatening statements.
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Campus Threat Assessment: Today and in the Future
Over the past 10 years, campus threat assessment and management
has evolved from a seldom used novelty, to a part of the standard of
care at institutions of higher education. While there have been no published surveys of broad samples of higher education institutions, available data indicate that the use of campus threat assessment teams is
much broader now than it was prior to April of 2007. Campus Security Report (2014) published their survey of a small sample of campus from across the country. They found that 94% of campuses survey had established teams to assess and or intervene with individuals
who may pose a threat.
In 2012, the U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Science Board
(2012) published an analysis of incidents of targeted violence across
sectors, and a review of existing approaches to prevent such violence.
The task force report, despite being titled Predicting Violent Behavior,
concluded that such prediction was not possible and that prevention
should be the accepted goal. The task force concluded that behavioral
threat assessment and management teams offered an effective means
of prevention, and that improved information sharing was critical to
the success of those efforts. Of note, the report cited the Virginia Tech
Threat Assessment Team as an example of a program for consideration by organizations implementing such approaches. Virginia Tech
had come a long way.
The threat assessment field was enhanced with the publication
of the International Handbook of Threat Assessment (Meloy & Hoffman, 2014). The editors and contributors providing a comprehensive
review of the science and practice of threat assessment and management across sectors, disciplines, and around the globe. The practice
of threat assessment and management in educational settings was directly addressed in four chapters (Deisinger et al., 2014; Hoffmann &
Zamboni, 2014; Mohandie, 2014; Mohandie & Meloy, 2014) and referenced in several others.
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A Final Note and a Dedication
The field has advanced considerably. The practice of threat assessment
and management has grown across campuses in the United States.
Increasingly, that practice is informed and guided by research, often with active partnerships between practitioners and academics.
There remains much to do as we work to prevent violence where possible and to mitigate harm where necessary. But the work done over
the past 10 years, honors the memory of those at Virginia Tech, and
across the nation, who have given so very much that we might learn,
grow and develop. Their memory reminds us all of who and why we
serve. That memory challenges us to become better as professionals,
and as a profession.
This article is dedicated to the memory of the Virginia Tech victims,
survivors, responders, and community. Ut Prosim.
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